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1 Introduction
In the last decades, the literature on social choice theory has seen important
generalisations of the classical Arrovian problem of preference aggregation,
starting with isolated contributions on abstract and algebraic aggregation theory
by Wilson [22] resp. by Rubinstein and Fishburn [20] and culminating in the new
field of judgment aggregation (for a survey see List and Puppe [18]). An essential
feature of these generalisations is the extension of the problem of aggregation
from the aggregation of preferences to the aggregation of arbitrary information.
It thus seems natural to exploit the potential of model theory, which, broadly
speaking, studies the relation between abstract structures and statements about
them (for an introduction to model theory, see Bell and Slomson [2]) and to
analyse the problem of judgment aggregation as the problem of aggregating the
models that satisfy the corresponding sentences (judgments).
This approach is justified mathematically by the fact that one of the major
tools of model theory, namely the ultraproduct construction, corresponds to
the construction of an aggregation rule satisfying axioms in the spirit of
the conditions in Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem [1]. At the heart of
this coincidence is a correspondence between Arrovian aggregation rules and
ultrafilters of decisive coalitions, which for the case of preference aggregation
dates back to a celebrated paper by Kirman-Sondermann [15] (with a precursor
in Fishburn [7] and Hansson [10, Postscript: 1971]) and has recently been
generalised to a model-theoretic framework (see Herzberg and Eckert [12], who
built on Lauwers’ and Van Liedekerke’s seminal work [17]).
For the case of a finite set of individuals, the Kirman-Sondermann [15]
correspondence (and its model-theoretic generalisation) between aggregation
rules and ultrafilters immediately implies a dictatorship result, as ultrafilters
on finite sets are necessarily principal, whence the ultrafilter on a finite set of
individuals always is the set of all supersets of a singleton — the dictator.
Whilst this dictatorship result does not carry over to the case of an infinite
electorate (where free ultrafilters exist), it is well known since Kirman’s and
Sondermann’s [15] identification of “invisible dictators” that free ultrafilters only
guarantee a limited amount of anonymity (as was also shown by Lauwers and
Van Liedekerke [17] in their model-theoretic framework and by Dietrich and
Mongin [5] in the framework of judgment aggregation). On the other hand, the
selection of one of the numerous free ultrafilters entails some striking inherent
arbitrariness, as was also pointed out by Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [17].1
Perhaps even more interestingly, the latter also have suggested another
source of impossibility results, viz. the existence of non-universal formulae in
the electorate’s agenda (e.g. formulae which describe the existence of a best
alternative or continuity of preferences). In this case the application of the
Paretian criterion of the preservation of unanimously accepted sentences leads
to a dictatorship even in the case of an infinite number of individuals.
In this paper, we explore this suggestion by Lauwers and Van Liedekerke
[17] further: In a model-theoretic framework (which allows for the analysis
of preference aggregation as well as of propositional and modal propositional
1As one of the referees remarked, free ultrafilters are non-constructible objects (even though
their existence is not equivalent to the Axiom of Choice, cf. Halpern and Levy [9]) and thus
the existence of aggregation rules with certain desirable properties based on free ultrafilters
(as in Fishburn [7]) should be considered a rather weak “possibility result” anyway.
2
judgment aggregation), we prove a theorem about the general impossibility
of non-dictatorial Arrovian aggregators that preserve certain unanimously
accepted non-universal formulae.
The next section summarizes the results of this paper, while the model-
theoretic framework and the results of this article are presented in Section 3 and
Section 4. A brief discussion of these results and further applications concludes
the paper.
2 A source of impossibility results for infinite
populations
In its most general formulation, the problem of aggregation consists in finding a
rule which assigns to each profile of individual charateristics a representative
collective characteristic of the same type (e.g. to a profile of individual
preferences, a collective preference relation is associated).
Thus, an abstract aggregation rule can be defined by a mapping f : ΩI →
Ω where Ω is a set of possible characteristics and I a set of indivuals. In
traditional Arrovian social choice theory, Ω is the set of preference relations on
some alternatives, while in the new literature on judgment aggregation it is the
set of all judgment sets from a given agenda of propositions.
This paper works within a unified approach to aggregation theory based
on the model theory of first-order predicate logic. Just as propositional logic,
modal logic, and predicate logic with a single predicate are all special cases of
first-order predicate logic, one can view judgment aggregation, modal judgment
aggregation and preference aggregation as special cases of the general problem
of aggregating sentences of first-order predicate logic. Thus we formulate the
aggregation problem as the problem of aggregating the models that correspond
to these sentences2.
The advantage of such a unified approach to aggregation theory is twofold:
(i) At a conceptual level, this approach provides a natural common language
in which results and methods from both preference and judgment aggregation
can be phrased, thus facilitating the translation of results and methods from
one area to the other.3
(ii) From a technical vantage point, the model-theoretic approach best
allows to establish the correspondence between Arrovian aggregation rules and
ultrafilters of decisive coalitions which underlies the dictatorship results for the
aggregation both of preferences and judgments.
Since the path-breaking work of Kirman and Sondermann [15] and Hansson
[10] it has been well-known that the properties of Arrovian aggregation rules
(essentially combinations of a Pareto and an independence condition of various
strengths) together with assumptions on the logical structure of the aggregation
problem (transitivity of the preference relations in the case of preference
aggregation, logical richness of the agenda in the case of judgment aggregation)
2A model is a relational structure consisting of a number of relations on a given domain
which gives meaning to the sentences of a formal language. If a given sentence holds true
under this interpretation, the model is said to satisfy that sentence.
3From a historical point of view, there is evidence for the influence of the founding father
of model theory, Tarski on Arrow’s foundation of social choice theory [21].
3
induce a particular structure of the set of decisive coalitions4. Ultimately, this
decisiveness structure amounts to an oligarchy, i.e. to the existence of a subset
of individuals which must be contained in every decisive coalition, or even to a
dictatorship, when this set is a singleton.
In the model-theoretic approach to aggregation theory, one can mimick
the arguments for the special cases of preference aggregation and judgment
aggregation (cf. Dietrich and Mongin [5] as well as Eckert and Klamler [16]) to
prove that Arrovian aggregator axioms together with assumptions on the logical
structure of the aggregation problem imply that the set of decisive coalitions
forms a filter5 or, under stronger assumptions, even an ultrafilter6. Conversely,
given any filter or ultrafilter D, one can define an Arrovian aggregator whose
set of decisive coalitions is precisely D. Let us call such an aggregator a D-
aggregator or D-(ultra)filter rule.
As a consequence of this correspondence, Arrovian aggregators are nothing
else but filter rules or even ultrafilter rules.
For finite populations this readily implies that the aggregation rule must be
oligarchic or even dictatorial.7
Now, if the domain of an aggregation rule is a set of models, an Arrovian
aggregator corresponds to a particular model-theoretic construction, namely
the reduction of a profile of models over a filter D. Such a reduced product
satisfies precisely those sentences which are accepted in those coalitions which
are members of D. In particular, by a fundamental theorem in model theory due
to Łoś, a sentence holds true in an ultraproduct (i.e. in the reduced product of
a profile of models over an ultrafilter) if and only if the coalition of individuals
in the models in which it holds true is member of the corresponding ultrafilter.
Thus, a D-filter rule is just the restriction of the reduced product (with respect
to D) to the original domain of the individual models (remember that that
collective outcome of an aggregation rule is assumed to be of the same type as
the individual characteristics and hence to have the same domain), and a D-
ultrafilter rule is the restriction of the ultraproduct (with respect to the ultrafilter
D) to the original domain (cf. Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [17]).
Now, restrictions of reduced products or ultraproducts (i.e. Arrovian
aggregators) do not in general preserve formulae in which existential quantifiers
occur, except when the underlying filter or ultrafilter (i.e. the set of decisive
coalitions) is merely the set of supersets of some coalition (i.e. an oligarchy
or dictatorship) — even for infinite electorates. In the setting of preference
aggregation, this means that an Arrovian aggregator which is supposed to
preserve either continuity or the existence of a maximal (or minimal) alternative
must be a dictatorship (cf. Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [17] and earlier work
by Campbell [3]), even if the population is infinite. The present paper shows
that the same phenomenon occurs in more general aggregation problems: For
4A subset of individuals is decisive (with respect to a given characteristic) if the collective
outcome always coincides with the respective characteristic of the individuals in this coalition,
e.g. if the collective ranking of a given pair of alternatives always coincides with the individual
ranking of this pair by the members of the coalition.
5A filter (on the population set) is a system of non-empty subsets of the population
(coalitions) which is closed under both supersets and intersections.
6An ultrafilter (on the population set) is a filter D with the additional property that for
every coalition C in the population, either C or its complement is an element of D.
7Indeed, for every filter D on a finite set I, there exists a set D such that for every C ⊆ I,
one has C ∈ D if and only if C ⊇ D, and if D is an ultrafilter, then this set D is a singleton.
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example, even if the electorate is infinite, any judgment aggregator which
satisfies Arrovian axioms and, in addition, preserves the existence of an
implication-maximal agenda item must be an oligarchy or a dictatorship.
Similarly, every modal propositional aggregator which satisfies Arrovian axioms
and preserves a non-trivial existential statement about possible worlds must be
an oligarchy or a dictatorship.
3 A model-theoretic framework for abstract
aggregation theory
In this paper, we shall work within a model-theoretic framework, in which
Lauwers’ and Van Liedekerke’s [17] model-theoretic approach to preference
aggregation (with a recent addendum by Herzberg et al. [13]) was carried over
to more abstract aggregation problems. 8
Let A be an arbitrary set.9 Let L be a language consisting of at most
countably many predicate symbols P˙n, n ∈ N.
The set of constant symbols will simply be the set A; however, within
formulae of the object language, we shall normally write a˙ instead of a (for any
a ∈ A). The arity of P˙n will be denoted δ(n), for all n ∈ N. (Following common
practice in mathematical logic, we use dots to distinguish symbols of the object
language, i.e. the formal language L under consideration, from the symbols used
in the meta language, i.e. the language of our present mathematical discourse.)
Let T be a consistent set of universal sentences in L.10 (In the case of
preference aggregation, for example, A would be the set of alternatives, there
would be just one binary predicate symbol, and T would consist of the weak
order axioms.)
The relational structure B = 〈B, {Pn : n ∈ N}〉 with A ⊆ B is called a
realisation of L with domain B or an L-structure if and only if the arities of
the relations Pn correspond to the arities of the predicate symbols P˙n, that is,
if Pn ⊆ Bδ(n) for each n. In this paper, we only allow for relational structures
which interpret every constant symbol a ∈ A canonically as a.
An L-structure B is a model of the theory T if B |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ T , i.e. if
all sentences of the theory hold true in B (with the usual Tarskian definition of
truth11).
Let B = 〈B, {Pn : n ∈ N}〉 be an L-structure with domain B. (Note that
this entails A ⊆ B by our convention.) According to standard model-theoretic
terminology (cf. e.g. Bell and Slomson [2, p. 73]), the restriction of B to A is
the L-structure
〈
A, {Pn ∩Aδ(n) : n ∈ N}
〉
and will be denoted by resAB. (In
other words, the restriction of B to A is the L-structure that is obtained by
restricting the interpretations of the relation symbol to the domain B ⊆ A.)
8For a derivation of the Kirman Sondermann correspondence in this framework see
(Herzberg and Eckert [12]).
9The set A may be arbitrary for our conceptual framework, but the main results of this
paper are non-trivial only for infinite A, as they concern existential quantification over A.
10A sentence is universal if it (in its prenex normal form) has the form (˙∀˙v˙k1 )˙ · · · (˙∀˙v˙km )˙ψ
for some formula ψ that does not contain any quantifiers.
11For instance, if B = 〈B, {Pn : n ∈ N}〉 is an L-structure, then for all a1, . . . , aδ(n) ∈ A,
one has
B |= P˙n(a1, . . . , aδ(n))⇔ 〈a1, . . . , aδ(n)〉 ∈ Pn.
5
Suppose now that B = 〈B, {Pn : n ∈ N}〉 is a relational structure with
Pn ⊆ Bδ(n) for each n and such that there exists an injective map i :
A → B. Then, the restriction of B to A under i is the L-structure〈
A, {i−1 [Pn ∩ i[A]δ(n)] : n ∈ N}〉 and will be denoted by resi,AB. If B is the
reduced product of A with respect to some filter D and i : A→ B, a 7→ [(a)]D,
is the canonical embedding, then we will drop the subscript i and simply write
resAB instead of resi,AB.
Let Ω be the collection of models of T with domain A.
Let I be a (finite or infinite) set. Elements of I will be called individuals,
elements of ΩI will be called profiles.
An aggregator is a map with domain ⊆ ΩI and range ⊆ Ω (so that individual
characteristics and collective characteristics are of the same type).12
As Herzberg and Eckert [12] have pointed out, this framework is sufficiently
general to cover the cases of preference aggregation, propositional judgment
aggregation, and modal judgment aggregation:
• For the case of preference aggregation, the centrality of binary relations
makes it particularly natural to express preferences by a binary predicate
in first order logic (cf. Rubinstein [19], Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [17]).
A more elaborate formalisation and complete axiomatisation of Arrow’s
theorem in first order logic was recently given by Grandi and Endriss [8].
• For propositional judgment aggregation à la Dietrich and List [4], one lets
L have a single unary predicate B˙, modelling a belief operator. The set
A will be the agenda. The interpretation of B˙a is “a is accepted”. (Thus,
the interpretation of Ai |= B˙a is “under profile A, individual i accepts a”,
and the interpretation of fD(A) |= B˙a is “under profile A, a is collectively
accepted”.) T can be any universal theory in that language.
• For modal judgment aggregation, one simply uses the reduction of modal
logic to first-order predicate logic, where the elements of the domain
correspond to possible states of the world. Thus, the set A will be the set
of states of the world. Let there be in L a predicateMp for each element p
of the agenda, modelling a modal belief operator with world argument and
proposition index. Let there also be a binary predicate R˙ in L, denoting
the accessibility relation. The interpretation of R˙(a, b) will thus be “b is
accessible from world a”. The interpretation of M˙pa will be “proposition
p is accepted in world a”. (The interpretation of Ai |= M˙pa is thus “under
profile A, individual i accepts p in world a”, and the interpretation of
fD(A) |= M˙pa is “under profile A, p is collectively accepted in world a”.)
The modal operator  will then not be an operator in the strict sense any
longer, but it can be defined as a family of sentences, indexed by p:
pv˙0 :≡ (˙∀˙v˙1)˙(˙R˙(v˙0, v˙1)→ M˙pv˙1)˙
The interpretation ofpa is “p is accepted in all worlds which are accessible
from world a”, or just “p is necessarily accepted in world a”. T can be any
universal theory in that language, which includes the axioms of the modal
logical system employed (such as K, S4, S5, etc.).
12In fact, all aggregators considered in this paper are restricted reduced products
(ultraproducts), whence their domain equals ΩI and their range equals Ω.
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Generalising the Kirman-Sondermann [15] correspondence between Arrovian
social welfare functions and ultrafilters of decisive coalitions13 on the set of
individuals, Herzberg and Eckert [12] — following a seminal paper by Lauwers
and Van Liedekerke [17] as well as recent work by Dietrich and Mongin [5, 6]
— have shown that given certain axioms, inspired by Arrow [1], on f and
some assumptions on the logical richness of L, every aggregator is in fact
given by a restricted reduced product construction with respect to the filter
of decisive coalitions. Under additional assumptions, this filter will be an
ultrafilter. Conversely, any filter on the population set can be used to define
an Arrovian aggregator. Given this one-to-one correspondence between filters
and aggregators, we may simply fix an arbitrary filter D on I and define an
aggregator fD, theD-aggregator as the map which assigns to each profile A ∈ ΩI
the restriction of the reduced product14
∏
i∈I Ai/D to the original domain A:




Observe that the restriction to A is essential since it is a necessary condition
(for fD to be an aggregator) that the aggregate model fD(A) belongs to Ω
and thus must have A as its domain. Moreover, if D is an ultrafilter, then, by
application of Łos’s theorem, for every L-sentence ψ,∏
i∈I
Ai/D |= ψ ⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai |= ψ} ∈ D,
which guarantees that
∏
i∈I Ai/D |= T and hence fD(A) = resA
∏
i∈I Ai/D |= T
since T consists only of universal sentences. Therefore, if fD is given as the
restriction of an ultraproduct to A, then fD(A) ∈ Ω for all profiles A ∈ ΩI .
13In our framework, a subset S ⊆ I of individuals is a decisive coalition if there exists some
L-sentence ψ such that both fD(A) |= ψ and
S = {i ∈ I : Ai |= ψ} .
If f satisfies some Arrovian [1] (responsiveness) axioms, one can show that the set of decisive
coalitions forms a filter, i.e. a collection of non-empty subsets of I which is closed under finite
intersections and supersets, and under stronger assumptions even an ultrafilter, i.e. a maximal
filter (cf. Herzberg and Eckert [12], generalising similar findings by Kirman and Sondermann
[15], Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [17], Dietrich and Mongin [5]). Note that under these
conditions on f , it even makes no difference if one replaces the “S =” in the above definition
of a decisive coalition by “S ⊆” and “there exists some ψ” by “for all ψ”.
From the ultrafilter property of the set of decisive coalitions, one can immediately deduce
Arrow’s theorem by noting that every ultrafilter on a finite set is principal, i.e. its intersection
equals a singleton (the element of this singleton being the dictator if the ultrafilter is a set of
decisive coalitions). Non-principal ultrafilters are called free.
14The reduced product
∏
i∈I Ai/D is the set of equivalence classes of sequences of
alternatives with respect to the equivalence relation ∼D, defined as
a ∼D a′ ⇔
{
i ∈ I : ai = a′i
} ∈ D
for all a, a′ ∈ AI . Similarly, one can define interpretations PΠn of the relation symbols P˙n,






〉 ∈ PΠn :⇔ {i ∈ I : 〈ai, a′i〉 ∈ PAin } ∈ D
Since D is a filter, ∼D is an equivalence relation, which also implies that PΠn is well-





PΠn : n ∈ N
}〉
is an L-structure. The set A can be canonically embedded
into
∏
i∈I Ai/D through a 7→ [(a)i∈I ]∼D . Therefore, one can restrict the L-structure of the
reduced product to A and obtain an L-structure with domain A.
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4 Impossibility theorems for infinite populations
In the case of a finite number of individuals dictatorship results immediately
follow from the principality of any ultrafilter on a finite set. For the case of
an infinite set of individuals there exist free ultrafilters and therefore Arrow’s
impossibility theorem does not apply (as was already shown by Fishburn [7]).
However, the very construction of an ultraproduct bears another source
of impossibility results as remarked by Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [17]:
Ultraproducts with respect to free ultrafilters have a strictly larger domain than
the factor structures, and thus, witnesses to certain existential statements in the
ultraproduct do not need to belong to the domain of the factor structures (cf.
Hodges [14] for a more comprehensive discussion of the role of ultraproducts for
the construction of extensions of given structures). Therefore, if an aggregator is
the restriction (to the factor domain) of an ultraproduct15 and, by application of
a Pareto condition, is required to preserve some unanimously held non-universal
statement (for example: existence of a best alternative; continuity; etc.), it must
be the restriction of an ultraproduct with respect to a principal ultrafilter and
will thus be dictatorial.
Indeed, Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [17] have remarked that in the setting
of preference aggregation, the preservation of non-universal formulae generically
leads to dictatorial impossiblity results (e.g. Campbell’s theorem on the
translation of the Arrovian dictatorship result to infinite populations when
preferences are assumed to be continuous [3]). The same phenomenon can be
observed in the more general setting of first-order predicate aggregation theory.
In order to illustrate this, let us consider the simplest case, viz. preservation
of formulae with exactly one, existential quantifier in a restricted ultraproduct
construction. Suppose hence ψ = (˙∃˙v˙)˙φ(v˙) for some L-formula φ(v˙) with one
free variable, assume I is infinite, let D be an ultrafilter on I, and consider a
profile A = 〈Ai〉i∈I of models of T , all with the same domain A. Suppose that
whilst (˙∃˙v˙)˙φ(v˙) holds true in all models Ai, there does not exist a D-almost
uniform witness (i.e. there exists no a ∈ A such that the set of i ∈ I with
Ai |= φ(a) would belong to D). Then, Łoś’s theorem teaches that φ(a) fails in∏
i∈I Ai/D for all a ∈ A, and therefore ψ cannot hold true in the restriction of∏
i∈I Ai/D to A.
This phenomenon can be used as a source of more general impossibility
theorems in abstract aggregation theory: In this paper, we will prove
an impossibility theorem for aggregators which preserve some non-universal
formula.
Consider an arbitrary L-sentence which is not universal. In its prenex normal
form it can be written as ψ ≡ (˙∀˙x˙1)˙ . . . (˙∀˙x˙m)˙(˙∃˙y˙)˙φ (x˙1, . . . , x˙m; y˙), wherein m
is a nonnegative integer and φ (x˙1, . . . , x˙m; y˙) is an L-formula with m + 1 free
variables. For the rest of this paper, ψ and φ are fixed in this manner.
We say that a profile A ∈ ΩI has finite witness multiplicity with respect to
ψ if and only if Ai |= ψ for all i ∈ I, but for all a1, . . . , am, a′ ∈ A, the coalition
{i ∈ I : Ai |= φ(a1, . . . , am; a′)} is finite.
An aggregator fD is said to preserve an L-sentence ψ if and only if for all
A ∈ dom(f), one has fD(A) |= ψ whenever Ai |= ψ for all i ∈ I.
15For instance, Arrovian preference aggregators always map every profile to the restriction
— to the set of alternatives — of its ultraproduct with respect to the ultrafilter of decisive
coalitions, cf. Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [17].
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We say that φ is free of negation, disjunction and universal quantification if
and only if its non-abbreviated form does not contain the symbols ¬˙, ∨˙ nor ∀˙, in
other words, if the only logical symbols appearing in it are ∧˙ and ∃˙. Henceforth
we assume φ to possess this property.0
With this terminology, we have the following impossibility theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Let D be a filter and suppose fD preserves ψ, and assume that
there exists some A ∈ ΩI with finite witness multiplicity with respect to ψ.
1. If D is an ultrafilter, then it is even principal (whence fD is a dictatorship).
2. D contains a finite coalition (whence f is an oligarchy).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. 1. Since fD(A) is just the A-restriction of the
ultraproduct of A with respect to D, Łoś’s theorem readily yields the
equivalence
fD(A) |= φ(a1, . . . , am; a′)
⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai |= φ(a1, . . . , am; a′)} ∈ D (1)
for all a1, . . . , am, a′ ∈ A. Since A is assumed to have
finite witness multiplicity with respect to ψ, we know that
{i ∈ I : Ai |= φ(a1, . . . , am; a′)} is finite for all a1, . . . , am, a′ ∈ A, and
that Ai |= ψ for all i ∈ I, whence fD(A) |= ψ as f preserves ψ.
Therefore, for all a1, . . . , am ∈ A there is some a′ ∈ A such that
fD(A) |= φ (a1, . . . , am; a′), hence
{i ∈ I : Ai |= φ (a1, . . . , am; a′)} ∈ D
by equivalence (1), although
C~a,a′ := {i ∈ I : Ai |= (a1, . . . , am; a′)}
is finite. Thus, the ultrafilter D contains a finite subset of I, viz. C~a,a′ .
But then, D must already be principal, namely D = {C ⊆ I : i ∈ C} for
some individual i ∈ C~a,a′ . The individual i is the dictator.
2. By assumption, fD(A) is just the A-restriction of the reduced product of
A with respect to D. Since φ is free of negation, disjunction and universal
quantification, an analysis of the proof of Łoś’s theorem reveals that we
must have
fD(A) |= φ(a1, . . . , am; a′)
⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai |= φ(a1, . . . , am; a′)} ∈ D (2)
for all a1, . . . , am, a′ ∈ A. Hence, as before one can show that the filter D
contains a finite subset of I, viz. C~a,a′ . But then, D = {C ⊆ I : C ′ ⊂ C}
for some C ′ ⊆ C~a,a′ . This C ′, necessarily a finite set, is the set of oligarchs.
0Corrected after publication.
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Already Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [17, p. 230, Property 4 (of aggregation
functions)] had obtained a dictatorial impossibility theorem for preference
aggregators that preserve certain non-universal formulae. However, their
theorem is based on a syntactic condition which is quite restrictive as it entails
that A is countable and that I is the set of nonnegative integers N. (Lauwers’
and Van Liedekerke’s [17] proof strategy consisted essentially in constructing an
aggregator based on a free ultrafilter which does not preserve the truth value
of the non-universal formula in question, because the element which satisfies it
does, by construction, not belong to A.) Our condition allows uncountable sets
of alternatives and uncountable populations.
Moreover, even in the special setting of countably many alternatives and
individuals, our condition is at least as general as the one of Lauwers and Van
Liedekerke [17]:
Theorem 4.2. Let I = N and A = {αi}i∈N. For all n ∈ N, let ψn be the
formula




If T ∪ {ψn} is consistent for all n ∈ N, then there exists some A ∈ ΩI with
finite witness multiplicity with respect to ψ.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Suppose that T ∪{ψn} is consistent for all n ∈ N. Then
there exists for every n ∈ N some model An of T ∪ {ψn} with domain A.16
Then, for every k ∈ N and arbitrary a1, . . . , am ∈ A, the set
{n ∈ N : An |= φ (a1, . . . , am;αk)}
must contain k − 1, but none of the integers ≥ k. It is therefore finite. Since
A = {αk}k∈N, we conclude that for all a ∈ A and all a1, . . . , am ∈ A, the set
{n ∈ N : An |= φ (a1, . . . , am; a)}
is finite. On the other hand, ψn implies ψ, so each of the An is a model of ψ.
This proves that 〈An〉n∈I has finite witness multiplicity with respect to ψ.
It is not clear whether the converse of the Theorem holds. Is it absurd that
T ` (˙∀˙x˙1)˙ . . . (˙∀˙x˙m)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙(˙φ (x˙1, . . . , x˙m; z˙) →˙
∧˙m
j=1z˙
˙6=x˙j )˙, so that T ∪{ψn} will be
inconsistent (put e.g. x1 = z = αn+1) for every n ∈ N, while there still exists
some profile with finite witness multiplicity with respect to ψ? If so, then for
the special case I = N, the existence of a profile with finite witness multiplicity
would be equivalent to the above straightforward generalisation of Lauwers’ and
Van Liedekerke’s condition. Hence, proving or disproving the converse of the
theorem is a worthwhile task for future research.
16For, by completeness, there exists for every n ∈ N some model An of T ∪ {ψn} with
domain An, relational interpretations Pm ⊆ Aδ(m)n (m ∈ N) and pairwise distinct constant
interpretations cna ∈ An (a ∈ A). Since T ∪{ψn} is universal, the restriction of this relational
structure to {can : a ∈ A} will still be a model of T ∪ {ψn}. Without loss of generality, one
may assume that can = a for all a ∈ A.
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5 Discussion and applications
As shown in a companion paper [12], in a model-theoretic framework for
the analysis of aggregation problems the ultraproduct construction allows to
improve our understanding of the correspondence between abstract aggregation
rules in an Arrovian spirit and ultrafilters of decisive coalitions on the set of
individuals. Whilst this construction immediately reveals why dictatorship
results do not carry over to the infinite case — where free ultrafilters exist
—, it opens up another source of impossibility results, which we have analyzed
in this paper: Non-universal statements are generically not preserved under
aggregation. This problem is, of course, hardly surprising from the vantage point
of model theory (given that an important use of ultraproducts is the enlargement
of a given structure). However, it challenges one of the usual conditions on
aggregation rules — viz. that the aggregate model has exactly the same domain
as the individual models (the factor domains of the ultraproduct) —, as this
requirement can only be met for sufficiently rich theories if the ultrafilter of
decisive coalitions is principal, i.e. the aggregation rule is dictatorial.
Let us finally consider some applications of our impossibility theorem
(Theorem 4.1):
In preference aggregation, as already remarked by Lauwers and Van
Liedekerke [17, p. 231], any Arrovian aggregator which preserves either
continuity or the existence of upper bounds or lower bounds must be dictatorial.
The reason is that one can devise profiles with finite witness multiplicity with
respect to the formula expressing continuity of preferences, and there exist also
profiles with finite witness multiplicity with respect to the formula describing the
existence of an upper/lower bound. In particular, this yields an alternative proof
of Campbell’s theorem [3] (which asserts the impossibility of non-dictatorial,
Arrovian and continuity-preserving aggregators — regardless of the electorate’s
cardinality).
As an application to propositional judgment aggregation à la Dietrich and
List [4], consider a propositional judgment aggregator which satisfies Arrovian
axioms. Suppose that the agenda is infinite, satisfies usual agenda richness
conditions, and that the judgment aggregator preserves the existence of an
implication-maximal (implication-minimal, resp.) proposition, so that if there
exists for every individual some proposition in his/her judgment set which entails
(is entailed by) all other propositions that he/she accepts, then the collective
judgment set will also contain a proposition which entails (is entailed by) all
other propositions in the judgment set. Then, the judgment aggregator must
be oligarchic. Under stronger agenda conditions, the aggregator must even be
dictatorial.
For an application to modal judgment aggregation, consider now a modal
judgment aggregator satisfying Arrovian axioms. Suppose that there are
infinitely many possible worlds and that the judgment aggregator preserves the
existence of a universally accessible possible world, so that if for each individual
there exists some possible world which is accessible from all other possible
worlds, then there is also a possible world which is socially accessible from
all other possible worlds. Then, the judgment aggregator must be oligarchic.
Under stronger agenda conditions, the aggregator must even be dictatorial.
Another application lies in proofs of impossibility theorems for Arrovian
aggregation of variational preferences (convex risk measures), cf. Herzberg [11].
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